Oct 2026: Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces continues, with drone attacks again reaching Khartoum. HSSK/Khartoum has resumed domestic and international flights, but attacks near the airport on Oct 19 disrupted operations. Commercial overflights of Sudan remain subject to published contingency routes and prior permission under the ICAO contingency plan.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Sudan Risk Update - 2025

The primary risk is the conflict itself, including drones, military aircraft and air-defence weapons. These threaten civil aircraft at all altitudes, and military activity also puts aircraft and airports on the ground at risk, making unplanned diversions into Sudan hazardous. EASA advises operators not to enter the HSSS/Khartoum FIR over Sudan at any altitude. The UK and Canada also advise against entry. Nearby South Sudan adds an ATC complication, as services are unavailable above FL245 in the HSSS/Khartoum FIR over its territory and contingency procedures apply.



Major events:
Oct 2026: Drone attacks near HSSK/Khartoum disrupted flights. Air defences intercepted drones, but one crashed in a nearby residential area.
May 2026: Sudan reopened international traffic at HSSK/Khartoum. Drone attacks earlier that month had briefly interrupted ops.
Nov 2025: The RSF said it shot down a Sudanese military Il-76 near Babanusa. The army said the aircraft crashed because of a technical fault.
May 2025: Drone strikes hit HSPN/Port Sudan and other infrastructure, briefly disrupting airport ops.
Oct 2024: A foreign-registered cargo aircraft was shot down over North Darfur.
Apr 2023: Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF began, leading to major airspace restrictions and airport closures.

Oct 2026: Saudi airspace remains technically open, but Houthi missile and drone attacks have escalated, repeatedly targeting OERK/Riyadh and other locations across the country. OERK reopened on Oct 18 after more than a week of disruption. Attacks have also been reported near OEDF/Dammam and airports in southwest Saudi Arabia.



The primary risk is sustained missile and drone attacks by Houthi forces in Yemen, with recent strikes demonstrating that the threat extends across Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh. Air-defence responses also create a risk of misidentification and miscommunication - including along overflight routes.

Several states have issued airspace warnings for the OEJD/Jeddah FIR. We recommend avoiding Saudi airspace entirely, including overflights and the use of Saudi airports as en-route alternates. The northern route via Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea is the preferred alternative for Europe-Asia traffic.

Major events:
Oct 2026: Repeated Houthi attacks targeted OERK/Riyadh, including the passenger terminal. Attacks also reported near OEDF/Dammam, plus OEAB/Abha, OEGN/Jazan and OENG/Najran in the south.
Oct 2026: Safe Airspace raised Saudi Arabia warning to Level 1 - Do Not Fly.
Sep 2026: A Houthi ballistic missile targeted Riyadh, with subsequent disruption at OERK. Jeddah also closed at short notice during an air-defence response.
July 2026: Yemeni government forces struck the runway at OYSN/Sanaa to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. Houthi forces subsequently warned airlines against overflying Saudi Arabia.
2020-2022: Repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks targeted airports in southwest Saudi Arabia.

Oct 2026: Drone attacks continue across Russia. On 6 October, Moscow reported more than 650 Ukrainian drones targeting the capital region, most of them intercepted. Most operators avoid Russian airspace. Those still flying there should expect short-notice closures or reroutes, including during the day. Ukraine’s airspace remains closed to civil aviation, and restrictions remain in place in Russian airspace near the border.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Ukraine and Russia Update March 2022

The primary risk is that civil aircraft could be misidentified or caught in air-defence activity as Russia responds to Ukrainian drones and missiles. EASA advises operators within its scope to avoid Russian airspace west of 60°E at all altitudes. Several countries also restrict flights near the Ukraine border, and GNSS interference adds to the risk.



Major events:
Oct 2026: More than 650 Ukrainian drones reportedly targeted the Moscow region. Most were intercepted, and air-defence activity added to the risk for civil flights.
Jul 2026: EASA extended its recommendation to avoid Russian airspace west of 60°E.
Dec 2024: Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 was shot down near URMG/Grozny during Russian air-defence activity. EASA cites the incident as an example of the risk of misidentification.
Jul 2023 - ongoing: Drone strikes around Moscow have triggered air-defence activity and repeated temporary airport closures.
Feb 2022: Russia invaded Ukraine. Ukraine’s airspace closed to civil aviation, and several countries restricted their operators near the Russia-Ukraine border.

Oct 2026: FAA restrictions remain in force for covered US operators below 10,000 ft MSL in designated areas of Haiti, including around MTPP/Port-au-Prince. Overflights above 10,000 ft MSL and ops outside the restricted areas do not require FAA authorisation.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Haiti Crisis: Airport Attacked, Aircraft Shot, March 2024

The primary risk is gang gunfire and drone activity against aircraft flying low near MTPP/Port-au-Prince. The FAA reports at least 11 aircraft attacked in the area since February 2024, and keeps covered US operators out of low-level ops in designated areas. Canada, France and the UK also advise against low-level flights in the MTEG/Port-au-Prince FIR. France advises its operators not to serve MTPP/Port-au-Prince.



Major events:
Sep 2026: The FAA extended its low-altitude restrictions.
Nov 2024: Gunfire hit a Spirit aircraft approaching MTPP/Port-au-Prince. A JetBlue aircraft later found a bullet hole after returning to KJFK/New York.
March-May 2024: Gang violence and attacks forced MTPP/Port-au-Prince to close for nearly three months.

Oct 2026: Iran's OIIX/Tehran FIR has reopened to overflights, but multiple countries advise against entering the airspace, and the FAA prohibits flights by US operators in the FIR.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is misidentification of civil aircraft by Iranian air-defence systems during heightened military tension. Iran remains on high military alert, while missile activity, air-defence operations and the risk of sudden escalation create a high risk at all altitudes. The shoot-down of Ukraine International Airlines flight 752 over Tehran in Jan 2020 shows how quickly this can affect civil aviation.



Major events:
Oct 2026: Iran's airspace remains open to overflights.
Mar 2026: OIIX/Tehran FIR closed following US and Israeli strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian missile and drone retaliation.
Jun 2025: Israel and Iran exchanged missile strikes, prompting renewed airspace warnings.
Oct 2024: Israel and Iran exchanged missile attacks, leading to widespread airspace avoidance.
Jan 2020: Iran shot down Ukraine International Airlines flight 752 over Tehran after misidentifying it as a hostile target.

Oct 2026: Yemen remains an active conflict zone, and the vast majority of Yemeni airspace (the OYSC/Sanaa FIR) should be avoided. Several countries prohibit aircraft from overflying any land portion of the FIR. US operators can still use offshore routes UT702 and M999, while other countries permit flights on overwater portions of Yemeni airspace. The security situation has deteriorated sharply since Sep 2026, with renewed fighting between Houthi and Saudi-backed government forces and an increase in missile and drone attacks. Saudi airspace to the north and Somali airspace to the south also carry risks.

The primary risk is intentional targeting by Houthi forces and other groups with access to sophisticated missiles, drones and anti-aircraft weaponry. Civil aircraft are also exposed to the wider military activity, including Saudi-led airstrikes and Houthi missile and drone attacks.

Major events:
Oct 2026: Fighting has intensified between Houthi and Saudi-backed government forces, particularly around the Bab el-Mandeb area.
Oct 2026: OYAA/Aden airport was targeted - a missile landed near the runway as a Cairo flight was approaching and the flight was diverted to Jeddah.
Jul 2026: Yemeni government forces struck the runway at OYSN/Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing.
Dec 2024 - ongoing: OYSN/Sanaa Airport remains closed following Israeli airstrikes.
Jan 2024: US and UK airstrikes against Houthi targets began following missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea.

Oct 2026: OLBB/Beirut FIR remains high risk, with Israeli military activity continuing despite ceasefire efforts. EASA and several countries advise against entering Lebanese airspace, with limited exceptions for flights to and from Beirut that approach and depart over the sea.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is military activity linked to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, including Israeli airstrikes and the risk of misidentification by air defence systems. Although ceasefire efforts have reduced the intensity of fighting, military operations have continued - particularly in southern Lebanon. The risk to civil aviation remains high.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: Israeli airstrikes continued in Lebanon despite ceasefire extensions.
Oct 2024: Israel launched a ground operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
Nov 2023 onwards: Regional conflict involving Israel and Hezbollah led to prolonged disruption and heightened security risks in Lebanese airspace.

A civil war has been ongoing since 2014. Some progress made in Oct 2020 with the formation of a new government, but Libya remains an active conflict zone with armed clashes between various rival militia groups across the country. There is a high risk to civil aircraft. Libyan airspace (HLLL/Tripoli FIR) should be avoided entirely. Total flight ban for US operators, and several other countries have warnings in place.

The primary risk is a misident by Libyan air defense systems, or by militia who have threatened to shoot down aircraft operating in western Libya, including HLLM/Tripoli Mitiga airport. Military activity reported over the high-seas which is either operating as OAT or not in control with ATC. Risk remains high across Libya at all flight levels, and avoidance of all airspace and airports is strongly recommended.

The secondary risk is that reliable ATC services cannot be guaranteed. The past few years have seen regular ATS and radar outages across the HLLL FIR airspace, and severe limitations in VHF capability, with operators having to communicate with Malta ATC for guidance.

Read: Libya Airspace Update, Feb 2024 (OPSGROUP article)

Major events:
August 2023: Major evacuation of aircraft from Tripoli due to violent clashes and gunfire at Mitiga airport. Read: Tripoli mass evacuation of aircraft (OPSGROUP article)
July 2023: Italy cancelled its 10-year ban on flights to/from Libya. Aircraft are no longer banned from Italian airports and airspace if they want to fly from Libya.
Aug 2022: Militia air defense forces claimed to have shot down a US drone operating in the vicinity of Benghazi during a period of increased tensions and threats of renewed violence between competing militias vying for control of Tripoli.
June 2022: Failed attempt by militia to enter Tripoli to seize control of government offices, resulting in armed clashes and suspension of flights at HLLM/Mitiga airport.
Jan 2020: Multiple airstrikes targeting HLLM/Mitiga airport. Videos on social media showing planes landing at the airport as shells are falling in the background.
Nov 2019: Militia advancing on the capital, Tripoli, declared a no-fly-zone around the city, threatening to shoot-down civil aircraft attempting to fly to HLLM/Mitiga airport.
2014: HLLT/Tripoli airport closed after clashes between rival militias destroyed most of the airport's facilities. The airport remains closed to this day; most flights operate out of HLLM/Mitiga airport.

Ukraine closed its entire airspace to all civil traffic on Feb 24, 2022, due to a military invasion by Russia. There is an ongoing active conflict in Ukraine between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Russia, Belarus and Moldova have closed large sections of their own airspace near to their FIR boundaries with Ukraine.

All the major countries who regularly issue airspace warnings (the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy) have since issued total flight bans for Ukraine due to risk from military activity at all levels. (Several other countries have also issued flight bans for Ukraine but we have not listed them all here due to sheer volume).

The primary risk is an unintended targeting of civil aircraft by military, including misidentification (as with MAS17, UIA752), or confusion.

The secondary risk is potential lack of Ukrainian Air Traffic Control Service at short notice (Cyber Attack), and other unforeseeable non-normal operating environments for civil aircraft.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Ukraine and Russia Update March 2022



Prior to February 2022, there were two areas of concern in Ukraine - the conflict in the far east of the country (affecting UKDV/Dnipro FIR) and the double claim over ATC and airspace in Crimea (UKFV/URFV/Simferopol FIR).

Oct 2026: Mali remains volatile after coordinated attacks across the country in April. Armed groups remain active, and recent reporting describes continued military drone ops against insurgents. Mali and Algeria reopened their airspace to each other’s flights on July 10, ending the restrictions introduced in 2025.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Mali Airspace Risk Update - 2026

The primary risk is the fighting, including drone activity and anti-aircraft weapons. The FAA warns US operators to use caution at all altitudes. Other countries set minimum levels from 25,000 ft AGL to FL320, and France advises against using GABS/Bamako, even as an alternate. These warnings cover the parts of the GOOO/Dakar FIR and DRRR/Niamey FIR over Mali. Follow current ASECNA routes and restrictions, especially in the north.



Major events:
Jul 2026: Mali and Algeria reopened their airspace to each other’s flights after a year of restrictions.
Apr 2026: On Apr 25, armed groups including JNIM and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front launched coordinated attacks on government and military targets across Mali. Gunfire and explosions were reported near GABS/Bamako, and fighting has continued.
Sep 2024: Militants attacked the airport at GABS/Bamako and set fire to the presidential aircraft.
Aug 2020: Airports closed for 2 days during the coup, but Bamako ACC stayed open and overflights continued.

Oct 2026: Somalia remains highly unstable, with ongoing militant attacks and limited government control in parts of the country. In the north, Somaliland is seeking its own overflight permits, while Somalia says it controls the entire HCSM/Mogadishu FIR. Crews may also receive unauthorized ATC instructions.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Somalia ATC Conflict - 2025

The primary risk is from militant groups with anti-aircraft weapons and ongoing military activity, especially at lower altitudes. EASA advises against ops at or below FL260. US rules prohibit US operators below FL260, with a limited overwater exception for certain flights to or from HDAM/Djibouti. Germany’s warning excludes airspace east of 54°E. There is also a risk of unauthorized ATC instructions and conflicting overflight-permit claims in the north.



Major events:
Nov 2025: Somalia’s CAA reaffirmed its authority over the entire HCSM/Mogadishu FIR. Somaliland has separately said overflights need its permission, creating a dispute over permits in the north.
Feb 2024: OPSGROUP received several reports of aircraft within the Mogadishu FIR being contacted by a ‘fake controller’ on the same frequency, issuing conflicting instructions. More info here.
May 2022: Class A airspace implemented in the HCSM/Mogadishu FIR above FL245. More info here.
May 2020: An Embraer EMB-120 was shot down while on approach to Bardale airstrip, killing all 6 people on board. It was believed to have been accidentally hit by Ethiopian forces operating against Al-Shabaab.

Oct 2026: Kuwait has reopened to overflights through the OKAC/Kuwait FIR, restoring the central routing option between Europe and the Middle East via Turkey-Iraq-Kuwait-Bahrain-Qatar-UAE. Overflights are permitted between the OBBB/Bahrain and ORBB/Baghdad FIRs at FL280 and above.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk remains the potential for missile and drone activity linked to the wider regional conflict. Kuwait has previously been directly affected by Iranian attacks, including a strike on OKKK/Kuwait airport that damaged Terminal 1 in June. Although the threat from Iranian activity has eased recently, the wider risk of escalation remains.



Major events:
Oct 2026: Kuwait reopened to limited overflights between Bahrain and Baghdad FIRs at FL280 and above.
Aug 2026: EASA issued revised guidance for the Persian Gulf following the US-Iran conflict, identifying continued risks from missile and drone activity, air defence operations and military activity.
Feb-Jul 2026: OKAC/Kuwait FIR was closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict.

Oct 2026: Fighting continues between Congolese forces and AFC/M23 rebels in North Kivu around FZNA/Goma, near the Rwandan border. AFC (Congo River Alliance) is a rebel alliance that includes the M23 movement, and the front line remains unpredictable.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Africa Airspace Risk: Jet Shot in Rwanda - 2023

The primary risk is anti-aircraft fire and other military activity in eastern DRC, particularly at low altitude and near airports in conflict areas. The UK advises operators to avoid an area within 200 NM of the eastern boundary of the FZZA/Kinshasa FIR, between 1°N and 5°S. Canada recommends that its operators remain at or above FL260 in a defined area near the Rwanda and Burundi borders.



Major events:
Feb 2026: The AFC/M23 rebel coalition claimed an explosive-drone attack targeting FZIC/Kisangani, showing its reach extends beyond North Kivu/Goma.
Jan 2025: M23 rebel forces took control of Goma during heavy fighting, and FZNA/Goma closed.
Feb 2024: A drone attack damaged a parked military aircraft at FZNA/Goma. The aircraft appeared to be the target.
Jan 2023: Rwanda fired on a DRC fighter near Goma, saying it had entered Rwandan airspace. The damaged aircraft landed at FZNA/Goma.

Oct 2026: The OPKR/Karachi FIR and OPLR/Lahore FIR remain open to international traffic, but Indian-registered aircraft and Indian operators are still barred. The ceasefire between India and Pakistan has largely held since May 2025, but the situation remains fragile and military activity could resume with little warning. Separately, tensions along the Afghanistan border have risen again.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Pakistan/India Airspace Update - 2025

The primary risk is militant activity and anti-aircraft weapons, including missiles that can be fired from the ground, especially at lower altitudes in western Pakistan. In Kashmir, renewed fighting between India and Pakistan could put aircraft at risk of being mistaken for military targets. EASA advises against flights below FL260 over Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. France, Germany and Italy also advise caution at lower altitudes in the OPKR/Karachi FIR and OPLR/Lahore FIR.



Major events:
Oct 2026: Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Helmand provinces renewed cross-border fighting.
Feb 2026: Cross-border strikes between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated, but no new airspace closures or overflight bans were issued. Commercial traffic continued through the OAKX/Kabul FIR, including on routes P500 and G500.
May 2025: India and Pakistan exchanged strikes and shelling in Kashmir. A ceasefire followed, but both countries continue to bar each other’s aircraft.
Jan 2024: Iran carried out missile and drone strikes against a militant group in western Pakistan.
Dec 2023 - ongoing: Pilots reported GPS spoofing around the OPLR/Lahore FIR, particularly near OPLA/Lahore.
Feb-Aug 2019: Pakistan closed its airspace to overflights after major clashes with India.

Oct 2026: Government-aligned forces have retaken Mekelle after Tigrayan forces withdrew from the city on 3 October. Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to HAMK/Mekelle on 11 October, but fighting and wider tensions in northern Ethiopia continue.

The primary risk is armed conflict, including drone, artillery and anti-aircraft activity, particularly in Tigray, Afar and Amhara. The UK advises operators to consider the risk when overflying these regions. Italy and Germany warn of military threats across the HAAA/Addis Ababa FIR. EASA advises risk assessment below FL260, especially north of 8.5°N. French operators should remain at or above FL320 in specified northern airspace and use great caution below FL320 elsewhere in the FIR.



Major Events:
Oct 2026: Government-aligned forces retook Mekelle. Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to HAMK/Mekelle on 11 Oct. Fighting and regional tensions continue.
Sep 2026: Tigrayan forces took control of HAMK/Mekelle. Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to HAMK/Mekelle, HATF/Axum and HASI/Shire as fighting escalated.
Feb 2024: Fighting flared again in Amhara, including air strikes.
Nov 2022: A peace deal was agreed in Tigray. Ethiopian Airlines planned to resume flights to HAMK/Mekelle.
July 2021: HAAA/Addis Ababa FIR airspace below FL290 was closed over Tigray after a military aircraft was reportedly shot down near Mekelle.
Nov 2020: Conflict escalated in Tigray. Airways were closed, airports hit by rockets and missiles fired into Eritrea.
Sep 2018: Ethiopian ATC controllers went on strike. Retired and foreign controllers were brought in to cover ops.

Oct 2026: The OAKX/Kabul FIR remains open and uncontrolled, with no ATC service. It continues to carry Europe-Asia traffic rerouted around Middle East restrictions. Renewed Pakistani airstrikes have raised the risk near the border.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: March 2026 - Afghanistan Overflight Update.

The primary risk comes from military activity near the Pakistan border and the lack of ATC across the OAKX/Kabul FIR. EASA, France, Germany and Canada advise against ops below FL320. Italy’s restriction allows P500 and G500 below its 25,000 ft AGL limit, while US operators may use those routes from FL300. With no ATC, aircraft must follow published contingency routes and use TIBA procedures to maintain separation.



Major events:
Oct 2026: Pakistani airstrikes in Kunar and Helmand renewed cross-border fighting. The UN reported civilian casualties, while Pakistan said it had targeted militants.
March 2026: Middle East airspace closures sent more Europe-Asia traffic through the OAKX/Kabul FIR. Cross-border fighting with Pakistan also resumed.
Feb 2026: Cross-border strikes between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated; commercial traffic continues to transit the FIR including via P500 and G500.
Aug 2021: After the Taliban takeover and allied withdrawal, the OAKX/Kabul FIR lost ATC service and became uncontrolled Class G airspace.

Oct 2026: The LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR remains open, but the security situation is volatile. Missile and drone attacks could trigger short-notice restrictions and disruption. Some international airlines continue to suspend services to LLBG/Tel Aviv.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is missile and drone activity linked to Iran and regional militant groups, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. Air-defence activity and interceptions create additional risks from falling debris and sudden operational disruption. EASA advises operators to consider the potential risks when assessing operations and routing. Monitor Israeli instructions and be prepared for short-notice changes.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: Israeli airspace closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict, following US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iranian missile and drone retaliation.
Jun 2025: Israel and Iran exchanged missile strikes across the region.
Oct 2024: Israel and Iran carried out missile attacks against each other.
Oct 2023: Hamas attacks triggered a major Israeli military response, with Hezbollah also launching attacks from Lebanon.

Oct 2026: The OSTT/Damascus FIR remains high risk, although some regional operators have resumed overflights as an alternative to Iran and Iraq routings. EASA now permits flights at FL260 and above in most of the FIR, but prohibits operations at all levels in the western part. Several countries continue to advise against or prohibit operations in Syrian airspace.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is ongoing military activity, including Israeli airstrikes and missiles and drones being intercepted over Syria. Drones, rockets and MANPADS are an additional threat at lower levels. The risk is highest in south-western Syria and at lower levels, but can increase across the FIR if the wider regional conflict escalates.



Major events:
Oct 2026: EASA revised its guidance, prohibiting flights in western Syria at all levels and below FL260 elsewhere in the FIR.
Mar 2026: OSTT/Damascus FIR closed following US and Israeli strikes on Iran.
Dec 2024: Syrian airspace closed following the fall of the Assad regime.
Oct 2023: Airstrikes damaged runways at OSDI/Damascus and OSAP/Aleppo.
Feb 2020: An A320 diverted after being caught in crossfire near Damascus.
Sep 2018: A Russian Il-20 was shot down in error near the Syria-Cyprus FIR boundary.

Oct 2026: The US and coalition military mission in Iraq ended on Sep 30, with forces departing Erbil. Iraqi airspace remains open to overflights, but the withdrawal removes a layer of US air defence around ORER/Erbil while armed factions remain active. The risk of missile and drone attacks remains, particularly in the Kurdistan Region.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk remains missile and drone activity linked to regional conflicts, alongside the potential for misidentification by air defence systems and the presence of armed groups with access to anti-aircraft weapons. France, Italy and several other European authorities advise against overflights at any altitude, while the FAA prohibits US operators from flying below FL320. Despite the FIR remaining open, most Europe-Asia traffic continues to route south via Egypt/Saudi or north via the Caucasus/Afghanistan.



Major events:
Oct 2026: US and coalition forces left Erbil, removing a layer of air defence as armed factions remain active.
Mar 2026: ORBB/Baghdad FIR closed following strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation.
Jun 2025: Airspace closed during the Israel-Iran conflict, with missiles and drones transiting Iraq.
Apr 2024: Iraqi airspace closed during Iran's drone and missile attack on Israel.
Oct 2021: US operators were permitted to overfly ORBB/Baghdad FIR at FL320 and above under revised FAA rules.

The primary risk is from debris from missile re-entries striking aircraft overflying the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. North Korea regularly conducts unannounced missile tests in this area. Consider rerouting to remain over the Japanese landmass or east of it.

There is also a risk of mistaken identity in or near the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR boundary, as North Korea are threatening to actively shoot down reconnaissance aircraft in their airspace.

The US prohibits flights across all North Korean airspace, including the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. Several other countries have airspace warnings in place which advise caution due to the risk posed by unannounced rocket launches.

Major events:
July 2023: North Korea is threatening to actively shoot down reconnaissance aircraft in their airspace. This may put civil aviation at higher risk of mistaken identity in or near the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR boundary.
Feb 2023: Ballistic missile fired over the UHHH/Khabarovsk FIR and then landed inside the RJJJ/Fukuoka FIR near several international airways.
Oct 2022: Ballistic missile fired directly over Japan - the first to incur on Japanese airspace since 2017.
2017: North Korea launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both of these landed in the Sea of Japan, well inside the Fukuoka Flight Information Region (Japanese airspace), and significantly, at least one did not re-enter the atmosphere intact – meaning that a debris field of missile fragments passed through the airspace, not just one complete missile.
2015: North Korea gradually stopped notifying ICAO of missile launches, so that aircraft could avoid the launch and splashdown areas.

Read: North Korea Missile Threat, Oct 2022 (OPSGROUP article)

Following a military coup in neighbouring Sudan in April 2023, Sudan remains closed to all civilian flights, and in South Sudan, air navigation services remain suspended above FL245.

In South Sudan itself, following five years of civil war, a ceasefire has largely held since Sept 2018. Significant reduction in violence, but the political and security situation remains volatile. In the event of a serious deterioration, similar to those of July 2016 and Dec 2013, HJJJ/Juba airport may be closed at short notice.

The UK and France still advise against overflying South Sudan below FL250/260 due to the risk posed by anti-aircraft weaponry. The US published a similar warning but rescinded it in Aug 2019. Germany withdrew their warning in March 2025.

The primary risk now comes from no ATC above FL245 due to the military coup in Sudan, and poor levels of ATC provision for overflights below FL245 or for aircraft operating to HSSJ/Juba airport. In Jan 2021, ICAO published a letter warning of service disruptions and lack of qualified ATC personnel, the lack of contingencies in place, communication issues, the number of withdrawn navigation aids and above all, the lack of information being supplied to operators regarding these issues.

Major events:
April 2023: Military coup in Sudan. Sudan’s airspace now closed, South Sudan’s airspace now closed above FL245.
April 2019: Military coup in Sudan led to the temporary closure of South Sudan’s airspace.
June 2016: The South Sudanese army declared intention to shoot down aircraft without permits and/or not following proper procedures.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Sudan Airspace Update, Apr 2023

There is an ongoing active conflict in Ukraine between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine closed its entire airspace to all civil traffic in Feb 2022. Russia and Belarus have closed large sections of their own airspace near to their FIR boundaries with Ukraine. Moldova initially closed all their airspace too, but have since opened a section on their western border with the LRBB/Bucharesti FIR for flights to LUKK/Chisinau airport.

The primary risk is an unintended targeting of civil aircraft by military near the Moldova-Ukraine border, including misidentification (as with MAS17, UIA752), or confusion. The secondary risk is from spillover from the conflict such as Russian drones and missiles.

Major events:
Feb 2023: The LUUU/Chisinau FIR closed temporarily following reports of Russian drones infringing its airspace. Earlier in the month, at least two missiles also transited Moldova during a major military operation in Ukraine. Spill over risks from the conflict are being frequently reported.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Ukraine and Russia Update March 2022

There is an ongoing active conflict in Ukraine between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine closed its entire airspace to all civil traffic in Feb 2022. Russia and Belarus have closed large sections of their own airspace near to their FIR boundaries with Ukraine.

The US and Canada have issued an outright ban barring their operators from the entire airspace of Belarus, and several other countries have issued warnings.

The primary risk is an unintended targeting of civil aircraft by military near the Belarus-Ukraine border, including misidentification (as with MAS17, UIA752), or confusion.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Ukraine and Russia Update March 2022



Prior to Feb 2022, several countries and aviation organisations had urged airlines and operators to avoid the airspace of Belarus, following the country’s interception of an international flight bound for Lithuania and forced to land in Minsk on May 23, 2021. The forced landing of this flight was politically motivated, and the crew were misled into believing that there was a credible security threat against the aircraft.

HHAS/Asmara airport was targeted on 14 Nov 2020 by missiles from the Tigray TPLF, bringing Eritrea into the conflict and meaning that operations here should be avoided. See Ethiopia summary for more detail.

Oct 2026: Morocco controls most of Western Sahara, while the Polisario Front holds territory east of the berm. Fighting continues, and a reported drone strike killed 3 Polisario members in June.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Western Sahara Airspace Update - 2021

The primary risk is exposure to anti-aircraft weapons at low altitude. The FAA’s note flags this as a possible threat, but it’s for information only and does not restrict flights. ATC coverage is not continuous, and the airspace is split between the GCCC/Canarias FIR and GOOO/Dakar FIR.

Major events:
Jun 2026: The UN expressed concern after a reported drone strike in the Mijek area killed 3 Polisario members.
Nov 2020: The Polisario Front declared the 1991 ceasefire over and said it would resume armed ops.

Oct 2026: The May 2025 ceasefire has largely held, but tensions remain. India and Pakistan both protested after a disputed border incident on Oct 2. Their reciprocal airspace bans also remain in place.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Pakistan/India Airspace Update - 2025

The primary risk is renewed military activity around Kashmir, which could expose aircraft to air-defence activity or misidentification. The ceasefire has reduced the immediate threat, but we continue to advise caution near Kashmir and the shared border because military activity could resume with little warning.



Major events:
May 2025: Four days of fighting in Kashmir included airstrikes and shelling. A ceasefire was announced on May 10. Both countries then barred each other’s aircraft from their airspace.

Oct 2026: Turkey has renewed its warning after pilots reported intermittent GPS signal loss.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Turkey, Syria and Iraq: Airspace Risk - 2022

The primary risk is military activity near the Syrian and Iraqi borders, where aircraft and drones could be misidentified. The risk is worth considering near LTAJ/Gaziantep, close to the Syrian border. The FAA has also noted that local armed groups have access to shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, although it reported no specific threats against civil aviation. GPS signals may also drop out in parts of the LTAA/Ankara FIR and LTBB/Istanbul FIR, so use caution with RNAV/RNP procedures. More info: Special Briefing, OPSGROUP Members Dashboard

Major events:
Nov 2023: GPS Spoofing being encountered over the Black Sea in Turkish airspace.
Nov 2022: Shelling and a rocket strike were reported near a town in southern Turkey, close to the Syrian border.

Oct 2026: Niger remains under military rule following the 2023 coup. The security situation is still unsettled after mutinous soldiers attacked key sites in Niamey in August. Commercial flights continue at DRRN/Niamey.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Niger Military Coup: Airspace Reopens - 2023

The primary risk is armed activity and the chance of civil aircraft being caught in crossfire or mistaken for a military target. The coup has also left relations with neighboring states strained, adding to the risk of sudden regional escalation or airspace restrictions. EASA advises operators to assess the risk below FL260 in the DRRR/Niamey FIR.



Major events:
Aug 2026: Mutinous soldiers attacked the airport and presidency in Niamey. Government forces later regained control of the airbase.
Jan 2026: Islamic State claimed an attack on the airbase at DRRN/Niamey. Several parked civilian aircraft were damaged.
Jul-Sep 2023: A military coup led to temporary airspace and airport closures. Niger reopened its airspace in September.

Oct 2026: Fighting continues across Myanmar, with recent military airstrikes in Rakhine and a drone attack in September that briefly shut down VYMD/Mandalay.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: What is going on in Myanmar - 2022

The primary risk is fighting and air-defence activity. EASA, Canada and France advise flying at or above FL260. Italy and the UK flag risks below 25,000 ft AGL, while Germany’s warning applies below FL160. France also says to use only VYYY/Yangon as an alternate. GPS interference has been reported in the north.

Major events:
Sep 2026: A resistance group claimed a drone attack on a military air base at VYMD/Mandalay. Flights were briefly suspended.
Feb 2026: A drone damaged a passenger ATR preparing to depart VYMK/Myitkyina. The airport closed temporarily.
Jan 2024: An armed group reportedly shot down a military helicopter in Kachin state, likely with a shoulder-fired missile.
Sep 2023: Resistance groups attacked military sites, including hangars near VYNT/Naypyitaw. GPS jamming was also reported on airway N895.
Apr 2023: An artillery attack temporarily closed VYYY/Yangon.
Sep 2022: A passenger was reportedly hit by gunfire as an ATR approached VYLK/Loikaw.

Oct 2026: Pilots have reported unreliable or intermittent GPS signals across the RKRR/Incheon FIR. The likely source is North Korea.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: South Korea Airspace Risk Update - 2024

The primary risk is GPS disruption on arrival or departure around Seoul. South Korea advises pilots to use extreme caution with GPS. Keep a non-GPS navigation option available and cross-check position, especially near RKSI/Incheon and RKSS/Gimpo.

Major events:
Nov 2024: South Korea accused North Korea of GPS jamming that disrupted civilian aircraft and ships.
May 2024: A pilot reported GPS spoofing while approaching RKSS/Gimpo.

Oct 2026: Cyprus warns that GPS interference may affect the LCCC/Nicosia FIR. A separate caution about military aircraft flying without transponders remains in place.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: GPS Spoofing Update: Map, Scenarios and Guidance - 2023

The primary risk is military activity near Syria spilling into nearby airspace. The US advises caution within 200 NM of the OSTT/Damascus FIR, where GPS interference, radio jamming and stray missiles are possible. Military aircraft may also fly without transponders in the LCCC/Nicosia FIR, making them harder to spot. Cyprus advises crews to report GPS issues to ATC and use conventional navigation if needed.

Major events:
Nov 2023-ongoing: Crews reported GPS spoofing over the eastern Mediterranean, including navigation failures near Cyprus.
Sep 2018: A Russian military aircraft was shot down near the LCCC/Nicosia FIR boundary during strikes in Syria, raising concern for nearby civil traffic.

Oct 2026: The immediate disruption after the US strikes in January has passed. The FAA lifted its temporary restrictions and removed the related Notams. EASA’s warning expired in March, and no FAA flight bans or caution Notams are currently in force.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Venezuela & Caribbean Airspace Update - Jan 2026

The primary risk is lingering GPS interference and military activity. The FAA warns that GPS problems can continue after aircraft leave the SVZM/Maiquetia FIR, and that Venezuelan air-defence systems could reach civil flight levels, raising the risk of misidentification.



Major events:
Jan 2026: US strikes in Venezuela led the FAA to briefly restrict flights in the SVZM/Maiquetia FIR and nearby Caribbean FIRs. The restrictions were lifted within hours, and the disruption soon eased.
Nov 2025: The FAA warned of GPS interference and increased military activity. Several airlines suspended or rerouted flights, and Venezuela revoked six airlines’ operating permits.

Oct 2026: The FAA restrictions introduced after the US strikes in Venezuela have ended. Related Caribbean Notams were removed, and no FAA flight bans or cautionary advisories are currently in force for the TJZS/San Juan FIR.

The primary risk is unexpected military or state aircraft activity in a busy civil airspace corridor, especially if flights are not fully coordinated with civilian ATC. The FAA’s temporary restrictions and caution notices have all been lifted.



Major events:
Jan 2026: After US strikes in Venezuela, the FAA temporarily restricted US civil flights in the TJZS/San Juan FIR. The restriction was lifted within 24 hours, and related Caribbean Notams were removed later that month.
Nov 2025: The FAA warned of increased state aircraft activity in the TJZS/San Juan FIR as US military activity grew across the southern Caribbean.

Oct 2026: Fighting between Congolese forces and AFC/M23 rebels continues in eastern DRC near Rwanda’s western border, and front lines remain fluid. The conflict raises the risk of military activity near the border.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Africa Airspace Risk: Jet Shot in Rwanda - 2023

The primary risk is spillover from the conflict in eastern DRC. UK and Canadian warnings cite anti-aircraft weapons, but apply to specified areas within the FZZA/Kinshasa FIR in DRC, not the HRYR/Kigali FIR in Rwanda.



Major events:
Jan 2026: Fighting continued in eastern DRC despite diplomatic efforts, with rebels active near the Rwandan and Burundian borders.
Feb 2025: DRC closed its airspace to Rwandan-registered and Rwanda-based aircraft. RwandAir rerouted affected flights.
Jan 2025: M23 rebel forces took control of Goma and its airport, FZNA/Goma, during heavy fighting.
Jan 2023: Rwandan forces fired on a DRC fighter near Goma, saying it had entered Rwandan airspace. The damaged aircraft landed at FZNA/Goma.

Oct 2026: The ceasefire with Thailand is holding, but tensions remain along the border. The VDPF/Phnom Penh FIR is open, though Cambodia has set up a danger area near the border and rerouted some eastbound flights from L880/G474 via B204. In the VTBB/Bangkok FIR, Thai Notams report unmanned-aircraft activity near the border, so ATC may give aircraft radar vectors.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Emerging Airspace Risk: Cambodia & Thailand - 2025

The primary risk is that fighting could flare up again and disrupt nearby routes. Check the latest Notams for the VDPF/Phnom Penh FIR and VTBB/Bangkok FIR before departure.



Major events:
Sep 2026: Cambodia protested what it said was a Thai military helicopter incursion. Thailand denied that the helicopter crossed the border.
Dec 2025: Fighting resumed after the July ceasefire broke down. A new ceasefire took effect on 27 December after weeks of clashes.
Jul 2025: 5 days of border clashes, including airstrikes and artillery fire, ended in a ceasefire.

Oct 2026: The temporary FAA restrictions following US strikes in Venezuela have ended. The FAA removed the related Caribbean Notams, and no FAA flight bans or caution advisories are currently in force for the TNCF/Curacao FIR.

The primary risk is military aircraft mixing with civil traffic in a busy corridor, especially when they are difficult for ATC to track. Two close encounters were reported near Curacao in December 2025. The FAA has since removed its warnings for the TNCF/Curacao FIR.



Major events:
Jan 2026: After US strikes in Venezuela, the FAA briefly restricted flights in the TNCF/Curacao FIR and nearby Caribbean airspace. It lifted the restrictions within a day and removed the remaining Notams later that month.
Dec 2025: A JetBlue flight from TNCC/Curacao narrowly avoided a US Air Force tanker. A private jet also reported unidentified traffic nearby.
Nov 2025: Curacao’s aviation authority warned flights to and from TNCA/Aruba, TNCC/Curacao, and TNCB/Bonaire after unidentified aircraft were detected in the area.

Oct 2026: FAA caution notices remain in effect for US operators in specified Pacific overwater areas. They cover MHTG/Cenamer, MMFR/Mexico, MMFO/Mazatlan Oceanic, MPZL/Panama, SKED/Bogota, SEFG/Guayaquil and XX01/unassigned eastern Pacific. A separate FAA notice also covers MHCC/Central America FIR.

The primary risk is intermittent GNSS interference and military activity. The FAA advises US operators to use caution: military aircraft may operate near normal cruising levels with little warning, sometimes with transponders off, and GNSS problems may continue after leaving the affected area. The risk applies at all altitudes, including during arrivals and departures. There are no specific routing bans.



Major events:
Sep 2026: The FAA extended caution notices across Pacific overwater areas. They remain in effect through 13 March 2027.
Jan 2026: Reports of intermittent GNSS interference and US military counter-narcotics flights in the eastern Pacific prompted the FAA’s first caution notices.

Oct 2026: Missile and drone threats linked to the regional conflict remain a concern in OJAC/Amman FIR. EASA has eased its guidance, but some countries continue to advise against entering Jordanian airspace.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is missile and drone activity linked to the regional conflict. Previous attacks and air-defence activity have created risks from interception, misidentification and falling debris. EASA advises operators to assess the risks and maintain contingency plans, while France advises caution and Germany continues to advise against entering the FIR.



Major events:
Sep 2026: Renewed attacks highlighted the risk of a rapid deterioration in Jordan airspace.
Jul 2026: EASA advised operators to avoid Jordanian airspace at all altitudes following renewed regional hostilities.
Apr 2024: Jordan temporarily closed its airspace during Iran’s drone and missile attack on Israel.

Oct 2026: Egypt's airspace remains open. Regional tensions continue to pose a potential spillover risk around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba, but there is no longer an EASA CZIB covering Egypt.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is potential spillover from regional conflict, particularly missile and drone activity around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba. In November 2023, the UK warned of risks from heightened military activity linked to the Israel-Gaza conflict, after missiles and drones launched from Yemen were intercepted over the Red Sea and some landed near the Egypt-Israel border.



Major events:

Nov 2023: The UK warned of increased risks over the Gulf of Aqaba and Red Sea due to the Israel-Gaza conflict. Missiles and drones launched from Yemen were intercepted over the Red Sea, while others landed near the Egypt-Israel border. New Airspace Warning: The Red Sea, Nov 2023 (OPSGROUP article)

Jul 2019: British Airways suspended Cairo operations for one week due to security concerns.

Feb 2017: An SA-7 anti-aircraft missile tube was found less than a mile from HECA/Cairo airport.

Oct 2015: A Russian A321 was destroyed by a bomb after departing HESH/Sharm El Sheikh, raising concerns about insider threats at the airport.

Oct 2026: OTDF/Doha FIR remains open, but the risk of renewed military activity linked to the wider regional conflict remains. Some restrictions remain over Persian Gulf waters, and short-notice disruption is possible.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is missile and drone activity linked to the regional conflict. Qatar hosts major US military facilities and could be directly exposed to Iranian attacks. Air-defence activity also creates risks from misidentification and falling debris.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: OTDF/Doha FIR closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict before returning to normal overflight operations.
Mar 2026: An Iranian missile strike was reported near Al Udeid Air Base, close to Doha.

Oct 2026: The OBBB/Bahrain FIR remains open, but the risk of renewed military activity linked to the wider regional conflict remains. Some restrictions remain over Persian Gulf waters, and short-notice disruption is possible.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is missile and drone activity linked to the regional conflict. Bahrain hosts major US military facilities and could be targeted in Iranian attacks. Air-defence activity also creates risks from misidentification and falling debris. EASA has issued a warning covering Persian Gulf waters.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: OBBB/Bahrain FIR closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict before returning to normal overflight operations.
Mar 2026: Iranian missile and drone attacks affected several Gulf states, including Bahrain.

Oct 2026: The OMAE/Emirates FIR remains open, but the risk of renewed military activity linked to the wider regional conflict remains. EASA has warned of risks over Persian Gulf waters within the FIR, while several countries continue to issue airspace warnings for the region.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is missile and drone activity linked to the regional conflict, including the potential for attacks on the UAE and falling debris from air-defence interceptions. Debris from intercepted drones has previously fallen in Abu Dhabi, causing injuries and damage. The wider risk of renewed escalation remains.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: UAE airspace closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict.
Mar 2026: Debris from intercepted drones fell in Abu Dhabi, causing injuries and damage.
Feb 2022: Multiple Houthi drone and missile attacks targeted Abu Dhabi.

Oct 2026: The OOMM/Muscat FIR remains open and is a key part of the southern bypass route to avoid Iran.

See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - 2026

The primary risk is military activity around the Strait of Hormuz, including potential missile and drone attacks and air-defence operations. EASA advises against operating over the Gulf of Oman within OOMM/Muscat FIR west of 58°E at any altitude, except for arrivals and departures from airports.



Major events:
Feb-Jul 2026: Oman remained open throughout the Iran conflict and became a key part of the southern bypass route.
Jun 2025: Israel and Iran exchanged missile strikes, prompting renewed regional airspace warnings.
Oct 2024: Israel and Iran exchanged missile attacks, leading to widespread airspace avoidance.

The security situation in Papua remains poor. While there are no active airspace warnings for Indonesian Papua or neighbouring Papua New Guinea, the region has a recent history of armed groups targeting either low flying aircraft or airports themselves. Operators should take extra security precautions, including limiting time spent on the ground.

Major events:
Mar 2023: An armed group opened fired at WAYB/Bilorai airport. One plane on the ground was hit and another diverted.
Feb 2023: An aircraft was set on fire and the pilot taken hostage at Paro airfield.
Jan 2023: An armed group fired at an aircraft landing at WAJO/Oksibil airport. It went around and diverted.
June 2022: An armed group fired at an aircraft landing at Kenyam airfield.
Apr 2021: An armed group attacked WABL/Ilaga airport and torched a private helicopter.

The security situation on the ground in the Central African Republic is dire. There have been numerous attacks on civilians and peacekeeping troops in recent years. FEFF/Bangui airport is operating under UN control, and is subject to regular power outages. The US and UK advise against all travel to the entire country due to violent crime, civil unrest, and the presence of armed groups who control large areas of the country. There are no official airspace warnings in place for the CAR, but the general advice is to avoid landings here completely.

Major events:
Nov 2022: An unidentified aircraft dropped bombs targeting a militant group 150nm north of the capital Bangui. The group responded with small arms fire. Low flying aircraft in the area may be at increased risk.
Feb 2021: Deteriorating security situation. A state of emergency was declared due to post election violence. The government suspended use of all airspace by foreign governments and NGOs. For the second time, armed rebels attempted to enter the capital Bangui to overthrow the newly elected president. They got within six miles of the city before being pushed back by local and UN forces.

The primary risk is from debris from missile re-entries striking aircraft overflying the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. North Korea regularly conducts unannounced missile tests in this area. Consider rerouting to remain over the Japanese landmass or east of it.

The US prohibits flights across all North Korean airspace, including the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. Several other countries have airspace warnings in place which advise caution due to the risk posed by unannounced rocket launches.

Major events:
Oct 2022: North Korea fired a ballistic missile directly over Japan - the first to incur on Japanese airspace since 2017.
2017: North Korea launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both of these landed in the Sea of Japan, well inside the Fukuoka Flight Information Region (Japanese airspace), and significantly, at least one did not re-enter the atmosphere intact – meaning that a debris field of missile fragments passed through the airspace, not just one complete missile.
2015: North Korea gradually stopped notifying ICAO of missile launches, so that aircraft could avoid the launch and splashdown areas.

Read: North Korea Missile Threat, Oct 2022 (OPSGROUP article)

Pilots should exercise extreme caution while operating in Albanian airspace (the LAAA/Tirana FIR) due to a heightened risk of degraded ATC services.

In April 2021, Albanian airspace (the LAAA/Tirana FIR) along with LATI/Tirana Airport was forced to close, after a number of local air traffic controllers declared themselves temporarily unfit to work.

Local air traffic controllers are working under significant duress and high stress, having been threatened with dismissal (or worse - being arrested and jailed) if they do not declare themselves fit for duty. A number of foreign controllers were temporarily brought in despite not being trained or rated on any of the local positions.

Several international associations have published warnings, including IFALPA and IFATCA.

Chad in the past was a popular fuel stop in central Africa, but multiple travel warnings now advise against travel here (see the UK advice here, and the US advice here). No official airspace warnings have been issued for Chad, but danger remains high. FTTJ/Ndjamena airport was closed for 2 days in April 2021 due to security concerns following the death of Chad’s long term President - more info here. High threat for terrorism. Avoid landings.

There has been a high volume of crew reports of GPS Interference in the Philippines, leading to GPS/ADS-B dropouts, especially in the vicinity of RPLL/Manila.