Iraq is an active conflict zone. Local and foreign military continue to fight against an armed insurgency that has existed since 2017. There is a high risk to civil aircraft. Iraqi airspace (ORBB/Baghdad FIR) should be avoided entirely.

The US, Canada, the UK and France have all issued airspace warnings advising against operating in Iraqi airspace at the lower flight levels. The airspace adjoining the Baghdad FIR is also at risk: Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
 
The primary risk is intentional targeting by terrorist organisations who possess portable anti-aircraft weaponry. Civil aircraft may also be misidentified by the air defence systems of both local and foreign military who are active in the country. There is a clear risk to civil aircraft operating throughout the FIR at all levels however the eastern airways UL602 (between TAMSI and ALPET), UM860 and UM688 are considered acceptable by France and the UK above FL320.
 
Major events:
Oct 2021: US operators can now overfly the ORBB/Baghdad FIR above FL320. KICZ Notam A0036/20 which banned flights at all levels has been cancelled, and the SFAR now applies.
Jan 2020: US drone strike near ORBI/Baghdad killed a high ranking Iranian general. Considered a serious escalation. Anything that looks like a US asset or ally is now considered a target.
Jan 2020: Ukrainian Airlines 737 misidentified and shot down by Iranian armed forced in Tehran hours after retaliatory missile attacks against US bases in Iraq.
June 2020 onwards: Multiple rocket attacks on ORBI and the US embassy.

Read: Iraq Airspace Update, March 2020 (OPSGROUP article)

US and allied forces have pulled out of Afghanistan, and the Taliban have taken control of the country. Afghanistan’s airspace is now effectively closed to overflights - the OAKX/Kabul FIR is uncontrolled, and overflying traffic should route around the country.

The FAA bans US operators from Afghanistan’s airspace, only permitting overflights on airways P500 and G500 in the far east of the OAKX/Kabul FIR. EASA, along with authorities in several western countries, have issued similar warnings.

The primary risks are direct and indirect fire targeting airports and from surface-to-air fire targeting aircraft operating at low altitudes. Additionally, the conflict has resulted in limited ATC control across the airspace and an extreme threat to aircraft and crew safety and security on the ground.

Major events:
Aug 2021: US and allied military evacuations have finished at OAKB/Kabul airport. It is now under Taliban control. The FAA advises that there are no longer any ATC services available here, along with the entire OAKX/Kabul FIR.
Nov 2020: Major rocket attack in Kabul. Nearly two dozen rockets were fired from vehicles in several neighborhoods around the city causing multiple casualties. The road between OAKB/Kabul Airport and the Intercontinental Hotel was also targeted with an explosive device.

Read: OpsGroup Note - Afghanistan Ops Update & Situation Overview 13SEP2021

Yemen is an active conflict zone. A civil war which began in 2014 has developed into an international conflict. There is a high risk to civil aircraft. The vast majority of Yemeni airspace (OYSC/Sanaa FIR) should be avoided. The US, UK, France and Germany all prohibit aircraft from overflying any land portion of the FIR. US operators can still use UT702 and M999, while UK and German operators can use over water portions of N315, UL425 and R401 with limits as published by Notam (all well off the coast). Saudi Arabian airspace to the north and Somali airspace to the South also have risks.
 
The primary risk is intentional targeting by terrorist groups with access to sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry. Civil aircraft may also be at danger from on-going high intensity military operations including the use of explosive drones and missiles. Saudi-led airstrikes can occur at any time with little regard to civil traffic, including in the capital Sana’a.
 
Major events: 2017: OYSN/Sanaa badly damaged by coalition airstrikes. April 2018: Saudi airstrikes on Sana’a in retaliation for Houthi drone attacks across the border. July 2018: Houthi target Abu Dhabi Airport with explosive drones. Throughout 2020: Ongoing Houthi drone and rocket attacks targeting OEAH/Abha and OEGN/Jizan airports along the Yemeni-Saudi Border. September 2020: Multiple Saudi airstrikes on rebels in Sana’a, several near the airport. October 2020: Riyadh briefly on high alert for Houthi cruise missile and drone attack. 

Read: Saudi-Yemen Airspace Update, Oct 2020 (OPSGROUP article)

Following the shoot-down of Ukraine Int Airlines flight 752 over Tehran in Jan 2020, several countries issued airspace warnings for Iran, including: the UK, Ukraine, Canada, Germany, and France. The US and Ukraine are the only countries to have issued outright flight bans, but all the others advise against landing or overflying the country at the lower flight levels. The airspace adjoining the Tehran FIR is also at risk: Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The primary risk is a misident by Iranian air defense systems. Iran has shown willingness to use long-range, advanced anti-aircraft-capable weapons during heightened tensions and in close proximity to heavily flown international air routes. There is also a potential for Iranian surface-to-surface missile fire from western Iran, targeting terrorist positions in Iraq. The secondary risks come from ballistic missile test launches with no warning by Notam, and GPS jamming (including in overwater airspace over the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman).

Major events:
Jan 2020: Iranian Armed Forces shot-down Ukraine Int Airlines flight 752 over Tehran, having mistaken the aircraft radar return for an inbound missile. Just hours prior to the shoot-down, the US FAA issued “Emergency Order” Notams banning all US operators from overflying the airspace of Iraq and Iran. This was in response to an Iranian missile strike on US military bases in Iraq, which had occurred earlier that night.
June 2019: Iran shot down a US military unmanned aircraft operating in airspace over the Gulf of Oman with a SAM system.
Since 2017: Iran has conducted multiple ballistic missile test launches without issuing any Notams to warn civil operators, the latest taking place in late December 2019.

Read: Iran Airspace Update, March 2020 (OPSGROUP article)

Libya is an active Conflict Zone. A civil war is ongoing since 2014. There is a high risk to civil aircraft. Libyan airspace (HLLL/Tripoli FIR) should be avoided entirely. Total flight ban for US, UK, Canadian and French operators.

The primary risk is a misident by Libyan air defense systems, or by militia who have threatened to shoot down aircraft operating in western Libya, including HLLM/Tripoli Mitiga airport. Risk remains high across Libya at all flight levels, and avoidance of all airspace and airports is strongly recommended. The secondary risk is that reliable ATC services cannot be guaranteed. The past few years have seen regular ATS and radar outages across the HLLL FIR airspace, and severe limitations in VHF capability, with operators having to communicate with Malta ATC for guidance.

Major events: Jan 2020: Multiple airstrikes targeting HLLM/Tripoli Mitiga airport. Videos on social media showing planes landing at the airport as shells are falling in the background. Nov 2019: Militia advancing on the capital, Tripoli, declared a no-fly-zone around the city, threatening to shoot-down civil aircraft attempting to fly to HLLM/Tripoli Mitiga airport. Oct 2019: The US issued an emergency order prohibiting US operators from overflying the HLLL/Tripoli FIR except for altitudes at or above FL300 “outside of Libyan territorial airspace” - which is basically the international airspace over the southern Mediterranean Sea that is managed by Libya.

Read: Libya Airspace Update, Oct 2019 (OPSGROUP article)

Syria is an active Conflict Zone. A civil war is ongoing since 2011. There is a high risk to civil aircraft. Syrian airspace (OSTT/Damascus FIR) should be avoided entirely. Airspace adjoining the Damascus FIR is also at risk: Cyprus, Turkey, Israel. Total flight ban for US aircraft, and several other countries advise operators to avoid the airspace of Syria.

The primary risk is a misident by Syrian air defense systems. Civil aircraft may be targeted in error, or caught in crossfire during ongoing air attacks involving Israel, Russia, Iran. Missiles may erroneously lock on to civil aircraft. Israeli airstrikes on Syria are regular, and do not show any regard for civil traffic. There is a clear risk to civil aircraft operating on airways UL620, UW74, UR18, and UP62. In simple terms, if you find yourself planned overwater east of Cyprus, reconsider your route.

Major events:
Feb 2020: An A320 enroute OSDI/Damascus caught in crossfire during attack by 4 Israeli F-16’s, forced to divert to Russian controlled air base.
Sep 2018: Russian IL-20 shot down in error on FIR boundary with Cyprus (Nicosia FIR) - airline flights on UL620 within 50nm of this position.

Read: OpsGroup Note -Syria, Sep 2018 (PDF)

The conflict in the Northern Ethiopian region of Tigray continues. The country is on the verge of civil war. The Government military are engaged in active fighting with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) who are seeking independence. Several countries have issued airspace warnings cautioning against overflights of the HAAA/Addis Ababa FIR.

The primary risk to aviation is from misidentification/miscalculation by TPLF or government forces with the use of anti-aircraft weaponry. In other words - civil aircraft being mistaken for something of military interest, or simply caught in the crossfire.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Ethiopia: Increased risk for overflights, Nov 2021

Major Events:
Nov 2021: Six-month nationwide state of emergency declared, following increased fighting between the military and TPLF rebel forces in the north of the country. Several western countries have issued security warnings. The US is now saying “do not travel” to Ethiopia due to armed conflict and civil unrest, and is encouraging those who are in the country to leave. The conflict will likely intensify in the coming weeks - the government has urged people in the capital Addis Ababa to arm themselves, as the northern rebel forces advance to the south.

July 2021: HAAA/Addis FIR published a Notam closing a section of airspace below FL290 over the Tigray region along the Ethiopia/Eritrea border. This follows reports that militia shot down a military transport plane in the region the previous week, near the capital Mekele. Caution if overflying the area, particularly on airways UM656/UT124 between the HSSS/Khartoum and HAAA/Addis FIRs which have previously been closed due to the conflict.



Nov 2020: Major escalation of the conflict in the Tigray region, along the Ethiopia/Eritrea border. Some airways were closed by the Ethiopian and Sudanese CAAs. Other airways that were still open were very close to the conflict zone. These are frequently used by international operators on the Europe-East Africa route. In particular: UN321, UG300 and UL432. Multiple airports were targeted by rockets. Missiles were fired across the border into Eritrea, targeting HHAS/Asmara. Within Ethiopia, HABD/Bahir Dar and HAGN/Gondar were also targeted.



Sep 2018: Risk due to hidden ATC strike. Ethiopian ATC controllers went on strike, and the ECAA and Ethiopian Airlines recruited both retired and foreign controllers to pick up the slack. Ethiopia denied several times that there was in fact a strike happening at all. The strike ended September 7th. Many were not qualified to operate in Ethiopian airspace, due to inexperience.

There is an active conflict zone in eastern Ukraine along the border with Russia. The main hotspot is the Line of Contact which runs through the UKDV/Dnipro FIR. While tensions have lowered from their peak in April 2021, the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in this region continues.

The FAA bans US operators from overflying the eastern part of the UKDV FIR, and warns operators to exercise extreme caution within 100nm of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. Several other states have also issued airspace warnings for eastern Ukraine.

The primary risk is for operations near the Russia-Ukraine border in the UKDV/Dnipro FIR. Should hostilities escalate here, the airspace on both sides could be exposed to potential weapons activity posing a risk to civil aircraft from misidentification or miscalculation.

The secondary risk affects the UKFV/Simferopol FIR which is disputed airspace. (Ukraine:UKFV, Russia:URFV). The risk here stems from aircraft potentially receiving confusing and conflicting air traffic control instructions from both Ukrainian and Russian ATC when operating over the region.

Major events:
Oct 2021: US FAA updates SFAR extending flight ban on eastern part of the UKDV FIR to Oct 2023, but reports easing of tensions in the border region due to large withdrawal of Russian forces.
Apr 2021: US FAA warns of escalating tensions along the Ukraine/Russia border.
Oct 2020: US operators now allowed to overfly Crimea again (UKFV/Simeropol FIR). Ops in the eastern half of the UKDV/Dnipro FIR remain prohibited.
July 2014: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 flying over Ukraine at FL330 just west of the Russian border was mistakenly shot down after being misidentified as a hostile target by Russian-backed troops on the ground.

Following talks with the US in early 2018, North Korea agreed with ICAO that it would provide adequate warning of all “activity hazardous to aviation" within its airspace. However, in May 2019 North Korea resumed launching missiles into the Sea of Japan, without providing any warning by Notam.

The US prohibits flights across all North Korean airspace, including the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. Several other countries have airspace warnings in place which advise caution due to the risk posed by unannounced rocket launches.

The primary risk is from debris from missile re-entries striking aircraft overflying the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. Consider rerouting to remain over the Japanese landmass or east of it.

Major events:
2021: North Korea tested some short-range ballistic missiles, and a new long-range cruise missile with a range capable of hitting Japan.
2017: North Korea launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both of these landed in the Sea of Japan, well inside the Fukuoka Flight Information Region (Japanese airspace), and significantly, at least one did not re-enter the atmosphere intact – meaning that a debris field of missile fragments passed through the airspace, not just one complete missile.
2015: North Korea gradually stopped notifying ICAO of missile launches, so that aircraft could avoid the launch and splashdown areas.

Kenya is affected by the ongoing Somali Civil War - the main threat comes from militants in response to Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. The US has a warning in place to exercise caution below FL260 in Kenya’s airspace east of 40 degrees East longitude (the border region with Somalia).

The primary risk is from indirect mortar and rocket fire, including MANPADS, which could target aircraft at low altitudes and at airports.

Major events:
Jan 2020: Two US military/govt aircraft (C-146A, DHC-8), and two helicopters, were destroyed in a militant attack on HKLU/Manda Airport, a US/Kenya joint military base in Lamu county, east coast. Security concerns in this part of Kenya have been ongoing for several years.

Jan 2019: Al-Shabaab militants launched an attack on a hotel complex in central Nairobi on 15 Jan 2019, killing at least 14 people. There were a number of attacks by Al-Shabab in Kenya in preceding years, but none in Nairobi since the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in 2013.

The northern Mali War has been ongoing since 2012, and there have been no improvements in stability. The US, Germany, France and the UK all have warnings in place, advising to operate FL250/260 or higher, and avoiding GATB, GAGO, and GAKL airports, due to ongoing fighting and militant activity. We would suggest, as usual, that a higher level closer to FL300 is more sensible.

The primary risk is from indirect mortar and rocket fire, including MANPADS, which could target aircraft at low altitudes and at airports. The FAA say that militants in Mali primarily target UN and Malian forces which are often based near to Malian airports, and these attacks present an indirect threat to civil aviation.

Major events:
Aug 2020 All airports across the country were closed from Aug 19-20 following a military coup which overthrew the government. Bamako ACC remained operational throughout, with overflights unaffected.
April 2018: Militants attacked UN peacekeepers at two bases near GATB/Timbuktu Airport using both indirect fire weapons and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
Jan 2017 and Nov 2016: Militants conducted vehicle-borne improvised explosive attacks against GAGO/Gao Airport, and rocket attacks against GATB/Timbuktu Airport.

Senegal and Niger control the airspace over Mali, and they have long-standing Notams (published under the GOOO/Dakar and DRRR/Niamey FIRs) warning that you can only fly between FL320-400 through the entire airspace in Mali north of the GABS/Bamako TMA due to military ops across the region.

Following five years of civil war, a ceasefire has largely held since Sept 2018. Significant reduction in violence, but the political and security situation remains volatile. In the event of a serious deterioration, similar to those of July 2016 and Dec 2013, HSSJ/Juba airport may be closed at short notice. The UK, France and Germany still advise against overflying South Sudan below FL250/260 due to the risk posed by anti-aircraft weaponry. The US published a similar warning but rescinded it in Aug 2019.

The primary risk now comes from poor levels of ATC provision for overflights below FL245 or for aircraft operating to HSSJ/Juba airport. In Jan 2021, ICAO published a letter warning of service disruptions and lack of qualified ATC personnel, the lack of contingencies in place, communication issues, the number of withdrawn navigation aids and above all, the lack of information being supplied to operators regarding these issues.

Major events:
April 2019: Military coup in Sudan led to the temporary closure of South Sudan’s airspace.
June 2016: The South Sudanese army declared intention to shoot down aircraft without permits and/or not following proper procedures.

Houthi drone and missile attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia are increasing. These continue to be a persistent threat to ops to Saudi airports, and for overflights of the OEJD/Jeddah FIR. The most significant risk is in the south of the country along the border with Yemen, but OERK/Riyadh and OEJN/Jeddah airports have also been targeted.

The are several long-standing airspace warnings in place: Canada, France and Germany warn of a risk to landing anywhere in the country, but particularly along the border with Yemen in the southwest part of the OEJD/Jeddah FIR. There is definitely a risk to operations in Saudi airspace, even outside the ESCAT area.

The primary risk is from Houthi drone and missile attacks on airports across the country, but particularly in the south.
 
Major events:
Throughout 2021: Ongoing Houthi drone and rocket attacks targeting OEAH/Abha and OEGN/Jizan airports along the Yemeni-Saudi Border.
Sep 2020: Multiple Saudi airstrikes on rebels in Sanaa, several near the airport.
Oct 2020: Riyadh briefly on high alert for Houthi cruise missile and drone attack. 

Read: Saudi-Yemen Airspace Update, Oct 2020 (OPSGROUP article)

HHAS/Asmara airport was targeted on 14 Nov 2020 by missiles from the Tigray TPLF, bringing Eritrea into the conflict and meaning that operations here should be avoided. See Ethiopia summary for more detail.

The situation on the ground is highly unstable and there is an inherent risk to civilians and aircraft. The central government has little control of the major cities and ports, with ongoing attacks from extremist militants targeting civilians who continue to show an intent to target aviation interests.

The primary risk is to overflying aircraft at the lower flight levels, which may be targeted by anti-aircraft-capable weapons. The US prohibits flights across Somalia’s airspace below FL260. Several other countries have issued airspace warnings advising against operating below FL260 (Note UR401 SIHIL-AXINA is excluded from this by one authority).

Major events:
2020-2021: Multiple instances of Al-Shabaab attacks on HCMM/Mogadishu and nearby UN compound.
May 2020: An Embraer EMB-120 was shot down while on approach to Bardale airstrip, killing all six people on board - an accidental shoot-down by Ethiopian forces stationed in the region to combat Al-Shabaab.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Al-Shabab: A Threat Beyond Somalia, Jul 2021

Since the Arab Spring, Egypt’s stability and security situation as a state has declined.

-July 2019: British Airways suspends Cairo operations for one week due to security concerns
-In February 2017 an an SA-7 anti-aircraft missile tube was found less than a mile from HECA/Cairo airport.
-In October 2015 a Russian A321 was brought down over the Sinai peninsula by a bomb loaded at HESH/Sharm El Sheikh. The group claimed the IED was placed aboard the aircraft prior to departing HESH, raising concerns of potential insider threats at the airport.

There remains a threat from terrorism in Egypt, particularly in the Sinai Peninsular - most countries advise against operating to airports in this region, as well as overflights below FL260.

Couple of issues: Conflict with India in the Kashmir region in the northeastern corner of Pakistan, and concentration of terrorist group representation in the country. Military activity by Pakistan and India in the disputed Kashmir region poses a potential inadvertent risk to aviation at all altitudes, particularly in the OPLR/Lahore FIR. The consensus among foreign authorities is to cross the OPLR/Lahore and OPKR/Karachi FIRs at higher flight levels. Diversion/Landing in Pakistan is recommended against. Avoid operating to OPPS/Peshawar and OPQT/Quetta airports - both are near the border with Afghanistan. OPKC/Karachi Airport was attacked in 2014.

Ops resumed at HSSK/Khartoum Airport on Oct 27 following a military coup in Sudan on Oct 25. The main risk to aviation is the security situation on the ground. Civil unrest is widespread and there have been fatal clashes with police. There's no increased risk for overflights in the HSSS/Khartoum FIR, but keep in mind the lack of security if you need to divert - things are volatile.

Only one international airspace warning exists, that of France, recommending overflight above FL260 in the far southern and western edges of the country (west of the 27°E and south of 13°N) near to the borders with South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Chad.

The primary risk here now relates to its proximity to South Sudan - which has poor levels of ATC provision for overflights below FL245.

Major events:
Oct 2021: Military coup on Oct 25. HSSK/Khartoum closed for two days, with all flights suspended.
Jan 2020: HSSK/Khartoum airport was closed for five hours late on 14 Jan following gunfire on the streets of the capital, including in areas close to the airport. The clashes were between the army and former security agents who revolted over severance pay. The airport reopened the next day, with the government saying the violence was over and the situation was under control.
Apr 2019: Sudan temporarily closed its airspace all day on 11 April following a military coup which ousted the country’s longtime President Omar al-Bashir from power. This came after months of on-and-off protests against his rule.

Read: OPSGROUP article: Sudan Airspace Update, Jan 2021

Several countries and aviation organisations have urged airlines and operators to avoid the airspace of Belarus, following the country’s interception of an international flight bound for Lithuania and forced to land in Minsk on May 23, 2021.

EASA is requesting member states to tell their operators to “not conduct operations” in the UMMV/Minsk FIR, unless it is to ensure safe operation in case of unforeseen circumstances. Several member states have since issued Notams (which we have not listed here), but the language in these is a bit different - most say that EU operators are “requested” and foreign operators are “recommended” to not overfly Belarus.

The US has urged operators to “exercise extreme caution” until the FAA can better assess Belarus’ actions.

The forced landing of this flight was politically motivated, and the crew were misled into believing that there was a credible security threat against the aircraft. Understandably, this is of major concern to civil aviation.

However, we view this as a one-off incident, that is not likely to recur. We do not consider there to be additional risk to aircraft flying through the Minsk FIR. The warnings and advisories listed here are for reference only.

Rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air strikes on targets in Gaza and Syria could present a risk to civil aircraft operating in the region.

The primary risks are: misidentification or miscalculation by air defence systems, falling debris from air defence activities, ballistic impact while on the ground, and short notice airspace closures.

Major Events:
Aug 2021: Following an Israeli airstrike on Syria, Syria sent a surface to air missile towards Tel Aviv. The missile detonated off the coast of Israel and there was no damage.
May 2021: Rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air strikes on Gaza. LLBG/Tel Aviv Airport was forced to close on several occasions, as air defence systems were activated around the country to repel incoming rocket attacks. Ceasefire agreed on May 21.
July 2014: Major rocket fire from Gaza against Tel Aviv during the Gaza War. The US FAA responded by imposing restrictions at LLBG/Tel Aviv airport for a two day period, and EASA advised that operators suspend flights, which ultimately resulted in 30 airlines cancelling flights.

Read: Opsgroup article - Israel: Assessing the Airspace Risk, May 2021

The primary risk is misidentification by local militia who infrequently target Turkish military aircraft with MANPADS and weaponsied drones. Operations to LTAJ/Gaziantep should be carefully reviewed given its proximity to the Syrian border.

The secondary risk is from GPS jamming. There are frequent reports from crews of GPS signal interference in Turkish airspace - with some as far away as abeam Baghdad. GPS jamming is common through the LTAA/Ankara FIR, and especially on the border between the ORBB/Baghdad and OIIX/Tehran FIRs.

Major events:
May 2021: Attempted drone attack by local militia on LTCC/Diyabakir airport in South Eastern Turkey.
Jan 2019: Turkish security forces intercepted three weaponised drones during attempted attacks against sites in southern Turkey.

A new conflict zone is emerging in Western Sahara. The country is split down the middle - Morocco controls the west, and the region’s independence movement, the Polisario, controls the east. The Polisario have declared war on Morocco.

The primary risk is from anti-aircraft fire from the conflict. The FAA has published a note warning that the Polisario likely have access to anti-aircraft weaponry which may pose an inadvertent risk to civil aircraft up to FL120. The GCCC/Canarias FIR has issued a Notam warning operators to avoid using the airways over Western Sahara below FL200.

The secondary risk is from lack of continuous ATC coverage. Western Sahara does not control its own airspace - it falls within both the GCCC/Canarias and the GOOO/Dakar FIRs, which may complicate airspace management should the conflict escalate. The FAA advise aircraft operating in the region to stay in touch with ATC and be prepared for possible airspace restrictions and reroutes.

Read: Opsgroup article - Western Sahara Airspace Update, May 2021.

Pilots should exercise extreme caution while operating in Albanian airspace (the LAAA/Tirana FIR) due to a heightened risk of degraded ATC services.

On April 8, Albanian airspace (the LAAA/Tirana FIR) along with LATI/Tirana Airport was forced to close, after a number of local air traffic controllers declared themselves temporarily unfit to work.

Local air traffic controllers are working under significant duress and high stress, having been threatened with dismissal (or worse - being arrested and jailed) if they do not declare themselves fit for duty. A number of foreign controllers were temporarily brought in despite not being trained or rated on any of the local positions.

Several international associations have published warnings, including IFALPA and IFATCA.

There is an active conflict zone in eastern Ukraine along the border with Russia. The main hotspot is the Line of Contact which runs through the UKDV/Dnipro FIR. While tensions have lowered from their peak in April 2021, the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in this region continues.

The FAA bans US operators from overflying the eastern part of the UKDV FIR, and warns operators to exercise extreme caution within 100nm of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. Several other states have also issued airspace warnings for eastern Ukraine.

The primary risk is for operations near the Russia-Ukraine border in the UKDV/Dnipro FIR. Should hostilities escalate here, the airspace on both sides could be exposed to potential weapons activity posing a risk to civil aircraft from misidentification or miscalculation.

Major events:
Oct 2021: US FAA updates SFAR extending flight ban on eastern part of the UKDV FIR to Oct 2023, but reports easing of tensions in the border region due to large withdrawal of Russian forces.
Apr 2021: US FAA warns of escalating tensions along the Ukraine/Russia border.
Oct 2020: US operators now allowed to overfly Crimea again (UKFV/Simeropol FIR). Ops in the eastern half of the UKDV/Dnipro FIR remain prohibited.
July 2014: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 flying over Ukraine at FL330 just west of the Russian border was mistakenly shot down after being misidentified as a hostile target by Russian-backed troops on the ground.

The primary risk is from debris from missile re-entries striking aircraft overflying the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. North Korea regularly conducts unannounced missile tests in this area. Consider rerouting to remain over the Japanese landmass or east of it.

The US prohibits flights across all North Korean airspace, including the oceanic part of the ZKKP/Pyongyang FIR over the Sea of Japan. Several other countries have airspace warnings in place which advise caution due to the risk posed by unannounced rocket launches.

Major events:
2021: North Korea tested some short-range ballistic missiles, and a new long-range cruise missile with a range capable of hitting Japan.
2017: North Korea launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both of these landed in the Sea of Japan, well inside the Fukuoka Flight Information Region (Japanese airspace), and significantly, at least one did not re-enter the atmosphere intact – meaning that a debris field of missile fragments passed through the airspace, not just one complete missile.
2015: North Korea gradually stopped notifying ICAO of missile launches, so that aircraft could avoid the launch and splashdown areas.

Ongoing political and social crisis in Venezuela. On 1 May 2019, the US FAA issued a new Do Not Fly instruction to US operators, barring all operations into or over Venezuela, unless operating at or above FL260, and giving a window of 48 hours to leave the country.

Missiles fired by Yemeni rebels (Houthis) have reached Saudi Arabia multiple times, and they have threatened to fire at the UAE. In April 2019 a spokesman for the Houthis said - "Our missiles are capable of reaching Riyadh and beyond Riyadh, to Dubai and Abu Dhabi."

The primary risk in Lebanon’s airspace (the OLBB/Beirut FIR) relates to its proximity to Syria: civil aircraft may be targeted in error, or caught in crossfire during ongoing air attacks involving Israel, Russia, Iran. Missiles may erroneously lock on to civil aircraft. There is a risk to civil aircraft operating on airways UL620, UW74, UR18, and UP62. In simple terms, if you find yourself planned overwater east of Cyprus, reconsider your route.

Several countries have issued airspace warnings for Syria, banning operators from entering the OSTT/Damascus FIR. Many of these warnings include include the note that there is a potential risk to aircraft within 200nm of the Damascus FIR (i.e. the LLLL/Tel Aviv, OJAC/Amman, OLBB/Beirut and LCCC/Nicosia FIRs) due to military activity - possibility of GPS interference, communication jamming, and long-range surface to air missiles in the area.

Major events:
Feb 2020: An A320 enroute OSDI/Damascus caught in crossfire during attack by 4 Israeli F-16’s, forced to divert to Russian controlled air base.
Sep 2018: Russian IL-20 shot down in error on FIR boundary with Cyprus (Nicosia FIR) - airline flights on UL620 within 50nm of this position.

Read: OpsGroup Note -Syria, Sep 2018 (PDF)

N'Djamena in the past was a popular fuel stop in central Africa, but multiple travel warnings now advise against travel here. No official state Notams have been issued, but danger remains high.  A state of emergency remains in place for the Lake Chad region. High threat for terrorism. Avoid landings.

Two issues the LCCC/Nicosia FIR over Cyprus: proximity to active conflict zone in Syria, and GPS Interference.

The primary risk is from the proximity to Syria: civil aircraft may be targeted in error, or caught in crossfire during ongoing air attacks involving Israel, Russia, Iran. Missiles may erroneously lock on to civil aircraft. There is a risk to civil aircraft operating on airways UL620, UW74, UR18, and UP62. In simple terms, if you find yourself planned overwater east of Cyprus, reconsider your route.

The secondary risk is from GPS Interference. This has been ongoing since 2018. In April 2018, the Nicosia FIR began being used as a military staging for possible strikes in Syria, prompting EASA to issue a warning, and lead to avoidance of the FIR by many airlines.

Major events:
Sep 2018: Russian IL-20 shot down in error on FIR boundary with Cyprus (Nicosia FIR) - airline flights on UL620 within 50nm of this position.

There has been a high volume of crew reports of GPS Interference in the Philippines, leading to GPS/ADS-B dropouts, especially in the vicinity of RPLL/Manila.

The situation on the ground in the Central African Republic is volatile and as of June 2017 has been deteriorating rapidly. There have been numerous attacks on Civilians and peacekeeping troops. Bangui FEFF is operating under UN control, it is subject to regular power outages and is also acting as a refugee camp. Avoid landings.