Oman
Risk Level: Three - Caution
[ about risk levels ]
March 2026: Oman airspace remains open and is now heavily used as part of the main southern bypass routing around the closed central Middle East corridor. Following large-scale US and Israeli strikes on Iran beginning Feb 28 and ongoing Iranian retaliation, regional disruption remains significant. Iran has warned that conflict activity may extend over the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea. The situation remains active and unpredictable.
See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - March 2026
The primary risk is spillover of missile or drone activity into Gulf airspace, short-notice airspace restrictions, and reported GNSS interference. Oman forms part of the Egypt - Saudi - Oman southern bypass, which is seeing higher-than-normal traffic levels.
France currently advises its operators not to enter the OOMM/Muscat FIR. EASA’s latest CZIB applies at all altitudes to Oman due to the risk from missiles, air defence systems and interception activity.
Major events:
March 2026: Central Middle East corridor closed following US and Israeli strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian retaliation; Oman becomes key southern bypass route.
June 2025: Israel and Iran exchanged missile strikes, prompting renewed airspace warnings across the Gulf region.
Oct 2024: Israel and Iran carried out missile attacks against each other, leading many operators to avoid airspace between the two countries.
See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation - March 2026
The primary risk is spillover of missile or drone activity into Gulf airspace, short-notice airspace restrictions, and reported GNSS interference. Oman forms part of the Egypt - Saudi - Oman southern bypass, which is seeing higher-than-normal traffic levels.
France currently advises its operators not to enter the OOMM/Muscat FIR. EASA’s latest CZIB applies at all altitudes to Oman due to the risk from missiles, air defence systems and interception activity.
Major events:
March 2026: Central Middle East corridor closed following US and Israeli strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian retaliation; Oman becomes key southern bypass route.
June 2025: Israel and Iran exchanged missile strikes, prompting renewed airspace warnings across the Gulf region.
Oct 2024: Israel and Iran carried out missile attacks against each other, leading many operators to avoid airspace between the two countries.
Current warnings list :
| Source | Reference | Issued | Valid to | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | Notam LFFF F1000/26 | 12 May 2026 | 27 May 2026 | |
| EASA | CZIB 2026-03-R10 | 28 Feb 2026 | 27 May 2026 |
Source: France
Reference: Notam LFFF F1000/26
Issued: 12-May-26, valid until: 27 May 2026
Plain English: French operators are advised to exercise great caution and carry out a robust risk assessment before operating in Muscat FIR (OOMM).
FRENCH AIR CARRIERS AND CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT IN CHARGE OF AIR SERVICES OPERATED BY CARRIERS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE ISSUED BY FRANCE, WHETHER THEY ARE CONTRACTUAL CARRIERS AND/OR OPERATING CARRIERS, OR PERFORMING AIR SERVICES THROUGH A WET LEASE OR A CODESHARE AGREEMENT AS WELL AS FOR ANY FLIGHT MADE WITH AN AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN FRANCE ARE REQUESTED TO EXERCISE GREAT CAUTION WHEN OPERATING INTO THE AIRSPACE OF OMAN (FIR MUSCAT (OOMM)). THE AIR OPERATOR MUST CARRY OUT A ROBUST RISK ASSESSMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE FLIGHT CAN BE CONDUCTED UNDER SATISFACTORY SAFETY AND SECURITY CONDITIONS BEFORE ENTERING THIS AIRSPACE OF OMAN.
Source: EASA
Reference: CZIB 2026-03-R10
Issued: 28-Feb-26, valid until: 27 May 2026
Plain English: Operators should avoid Iran, Iraq and Lebanon airspace, and exercise caution in Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, the European Commission and Member States in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel conducted military strikes targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks. The resulting military conflict created high risks not only to the airspace of Iran but also to that of neighbouring States hosting U.S. military bases or otherwise affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.
A temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran, announced on 8 April 2026 and subsequently extended on 21 April 2026, is currently holding. As a result, the situation has moved from an active intense conflict with a high number of kinetic events to a state of heightened tension, with limited, sporadic and confined kinetic events of low intensity. However, maritime incidents are still taking place in the Strait of Hormuz and neighbouring airspace, affecting in particular UAE.
Given the ongoing high level of tensions and the potential for further military action, Iran maintains a high level of alert for its air force and air defence units nationwide, which creates an increased likelihood of misidentification within the FIR Tehran (OIIX).
In addition, the airspace over Iraq (ORBB/FIR Baghdad) continues to be affected by recurrent Iranian strikes and the ongoing operations of violent non-state actors (VNSAs), in particular Iranian-backed militant groups (IBMGs).
Furthermore, due to the recurrence of military activity affecting the airspace of Lebanon and the limited actions in terms of air space risk management of the State concerned, there is high risk to civil aircraft at all altitudes and flight levels within the airspace of Lebanon.
While the overall level of risk has decreased in the region, the sustainability of the ceasefire remains uncertain in the longer term, with a possibility of rapid escalation. Therefore, close monitoring and up-to-date risk assessments remain essential to ensure safety of flights. Should the existing truce break down, the airspaces covered by this Bulletin are likely to be exposed to imminent threats.
In terms of airspace management during the conflict, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions, thereby contributing to the mitigation of risks to civil aviation.
EASA, together with the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.
Air operators should:
1. Not operate within the affected airspace of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon at all flight levels and altitudes.
2. Exercise caution and take potential risks into account when operating within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia.
3. Ensure that an up-to-date risk assessment and a high level of contingency planning are in place for operations within the airspace specified in point 2 above, and be prepared for short notice instructions from the State authorities.
4. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.
Air operators are reminded that the following CZIBs remain in effect with recommendations not to operate at all flight levels and altitudes:
* CZIB on airspace of Syria (CZIB-2017-03R19)
* CZIB on airspace of Yemen – Sana’a Flight Information Region (CZIB-2017-07R19)
The present CZIB supersedes the following CZIBs:
* CZIB on Iran and neighbouring airspace (2026-02-R1)
* CZIB on the airspace of Lebanon (2024-01 R7);
* CZIB on the airspace of Iraq (CZIB-2017-04R19);
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel conducted military strikes targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks. The resulting military conflict created high risks not only to the airspace of Iran but also to that of neighbouring States hosting U.S. military bases or otherwise affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.
A temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran, announced on 8 April 2026 and subsequently extended on 21 April 2026, is currently holding. As a result, the situation has moved from an active intense conflict with a high number of kinetic events to a state of heightened tension, with limited, sporadic and confined kinetic events of low intensity. However, maritime incidents are still taking place in the Strait of Hormuz and neighbouring airspace, affecting in particular UAE.
Given the ongoing high level of tensions and the potential for further military action, Iran maintains a high level of alert for its air force and air defence units nationwide, which creates an increased likelihood of misidentification within the FIR Tehran (OIIX).
In addition, the airspace over Iraq (ORBB/FIR Baghdad) continues to be affected by recurrent Iranian strikes and the ongoing operations of violent non-state actors (VNSAs), in particular Iranian-backed militant groups (IBMGs).
Furthermore, due to the recurrence of military activity affecting the airspace of Lebanon and the limited actions in terms of air space risk management of the State concerned, there is high risk to civil aircraft at all altitudes and flight levels within the airspace of Lebanon.
While the overall level of risk has decreased in the region, the sustainability of the ceasefire remains uncertain in the longer term, with a possibility of rapid escalation. Therefore, close monitoring and up-to-date risk assessments remain essential to ensure safety of flights. Should the existing truce break down, the airspaces covered by this Bulletin are likely to be exposed to imminent threats.
In terms of airspace management during the conflict, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions, thereby contributing to the mitigation of risks to civil aviation.
EASA, together with the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.
Air operators should:
1. Not operate within the affected airspace of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon at all flight levels and altitudes.
2. Exercise caution and take potential risks into account when operating within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia.
3. Ensure that an up-to-date risk assessment and a high level of contingency planning are in place for operations within the airspace specified in point 2 above, and be prepared for short notice instructions from the State authorities.
4. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.
Air operators are reminded that the following CZIBs remain in effect with recommendations not to operate at all flight levels and altitudes:
* CZIB on airspace of Syria (CZIB-2017-03R19)
* CZIB on airspace of Yemen – Sana’a Flight Information Region (CZIB-2017-07R19)
The present CZIB supersedes the following CZIBs:
* CZIB on Iran and neighbouring airspace (2026-02-R1)
* CZIB on the airspace of Lebanon (2024-01 R7);
* CZIB on the airspace of Iraq (CZIB-2017-04R19);