Jordan
Risk Level: One - Do Not Fly
[ about risk levels ]
June 2025: Major escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran. Ongoing exchange of fire with ballistic missiles, drones and widespread activations of air defence systems. Iran, Israel, Iraq - airspace remains closed to all flights. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria - risk remains high with missiles and drones transiting airspace. Conflict is expected to continue for several weeks.
See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation – June 2025
The primary risk in Jordan is from short-notice airspace closures due to Iran/Israel airstrikes. Jordan also has a high risk of GPS spoofing due to proximity to Israel/Lebanon. RNAV/RNP Approaches may not be available. False GPWS alerts possible.
See OPSGROUP Briefing: Middle East airspace situation – June 2025
The primary risk in Jordan is from short-notice airspace closures due to Iran/Israel airstrikes. Jordan also has a high risk of GPS spoofing due to proximity to Israel/Lebanon. RNAV/RNP Approaches may not be available. False GPWS alerts possible.
Current warnings list :
| Source | Reference | Issued | Valid to | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EASA | CZIB 2025-02 | 13 Jun 2025 | Ongoing |
Source: EASA
Reference: CZIB 2025-02
Issued: 13-Jun-25, valid until: Ongoing
Plain English: EASA recommends not to operate in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon at all levels; and advises caution in the airspace within 100 NM from the Israeli western and southern borders in HECC/Cairo and OEJD/Jeddah FIRs.
This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, Member States and the European Commission in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.
From 13 June 2025 onwards, Israel conducted a military strike targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran launched retaliatory attacks.
The ongoing military operations pose high risk not only to the airspace of Iran and Israel but also to that of neighbouring States affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.
The possession of all altitude capable air defence systems, advanced surface-to-air-missile systems, cruise and ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems and the use of air assets capable to operate at all-altitudes, including those with launching and interception capabilities beyond the borders of Iran and Israel make the entire affected airspace vulnerable to spill-over risks, misidentification, miscalculation and failure of interception procedures.
In terms of airspace management, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address existing airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions.
However, there are limitations and varying levels of ability to adopt such mitigating measures in a timely manner. The situation remains volatile, with a continuous heightened risk of military action, whether through direct strikes between the two countries, as well as the possibility for broader regional involvement.
Given the current and expected developments, there is thus a high risk to civil aviation in the airspace of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon.
As a consequence of the current conflict, there are also additional spillover medium level risks in adjacent airspace of 100NM surrounding western and southern Israeli borders in eastern part of the FIR Cairo (mainly over Sinai) and the northern part of the FIR Jeddah.
EASA, the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.
Air operators should:
1. Not operate within the affected airspace at all flight levels;
2. Take potential risks into account in their risk assessments and routing decisions for the portions of the airspace within 100 NM from the Israeli western and southern borders in FIR Cairo and FIR Jeddah.
3. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.
From 13 June 2025 onwards, Israel conducted a military strike targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran launched retaliatory attacks.
The ongoing military operations pose high risk not only to the airspace of Iran and Israel but also to that of neighbouring States affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.
The possession of all altitude capable air defence systems, advanced surface-to-air-missile systems, cruise and ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems and the use of air assets capable to operate at all-altitudes, including those with launching and interception capabilities beyond the borders of Iran and Israel make the entire affected airspace vulnerable to spill-over risks, misidentification, miscalculation and failure of interception procedures.
In terms of airspace management, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address existing airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions.
However, there are limitations and varying levels of ability to adopt such mitigating measures in a timely manner. The situation remains volatile, with a continuous heightened risk of military action, whether through direct strikes between the two countries, as well as the possibility for broader regional involvement.
Given the current and expected developments, there is thus a high risk to civil aviation in the airspace of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon.
As a consequence of the current conflict, there are also additional spillover medium level risks in adjacent airspace of 100NM surrounding western and southern Israeli borders in eastern part of the FIR Cairo (mainly over Sinai) and the northern part of the FIR Jeddah.
EASA, the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.
Air operators should:
1. Not operate within the affected airspace at all flight levels;
2. Take potential risks into account in their risk assessments and routing decisions for the portions of the airspace within 100 NM from the Israeli western and southern borders in FIR Cairo and FIR Jeddah.
3. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.